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Tuesday, October 21, 2003

Where Do We Stand—Cross-Strait Relations in Taiwan’s 2004 Elections A speech prepared for delivery at the U.S.-China Policy Foundation luncheon meeting


Mr. Chairperson, Ladies and Gentlemen:

As I look around this room I see many familiar faces—former officials, think tank scholars, media representatives, university professors, or just old friends whom I have known for years, either from here or in Taiwan. I appreciate your presence here today, because you, mike many other Americans, are concerned about which way the island of Taiwan is going to turn, and what the future holds for its 23 million people.

Many of you are aware that, five months from now, on March 20, 2004, to be exact, we will hold another presidential election in the Republic of China. In 2000, the Democratic Progressive Party, or DPP, squeezed through to win just over 39 percent of the vote. The principal reason Mr. Chen Shui-bian became president was that the Kuomintang, or KMT, had split into two groups – with myself heading the KMT ticket, and Dr. James Soong, a former KMT secretary-general and governor of Taiwan, running as an independent then.

As the old saying goes, “a house divided against itself cannot stand.” We both lost, even though the two of us pulled a total of 60 percent of all votes cast.

We learned our lesson the hard way. The net result of the 2000 election was that the fortunes of the Republic of China took a nosedive in three and a half years of DPP rule. Unemployment topped 5.21 percent, unheard of in Taiwan before. Over 300,000 persons could not afford to pay the minimal health insurance premium of less than 20 US dollars a month, and were thus denied the benefits of national health care. Recently, nearly every important sector of the society – from teachers to railway workers, from tobacco and wine workers to telecom employees – have taken to the streets, to protest against the government’s mishandling of issues that affect their lives specifically.

Most important of all, people become alarmed by the seemingly inexorable trend of animosity between both sides of the 90-mile wide Strait. They fear that the DPP’s hidden agenda, moving in piecemeal fashion towards independence for Taiwan, would lead our country eventually to clash with the Chinese Communist regime, and worse still, drag the United States into the melee.

When Mr. Chen took the oath of office on 20 May 2000, he promised that he would not upset the apple cart during his four-year term. He pledged himself, first, not to declare independence for Taiwan; secondly, not to change the official name of the country; third, not to push for the inclusion of the ‘two states theory’ into the Constitution; and fourth, not to hold any plebiscite over the issue of independence. The media in Taiwan dubbed these points the “four no’s”. However, during the past year or so, by employing “salami tactics”, he reneged on all of these four promises.

In short, the DPP administration, in three and a half years of rule, has created a groundswell of dissatisfaction over its economic performance domestically, and an uneasiness over its cross-Strait policy externally.

Now, where does the opposition parties stand on the all-important question of cross-Strait relations? I’m sure you are all aware that back in February, the KMT formed an alliance with the People’s First Party or PFP, founded after the last election and headed by Dr. James Soong, to present a joint ticket in next year’s presidential race. Local media refer to us as the pan-Blue camp, as opposed to the pan-Green camp, comprising the DPP and the TSU, acronym of the Taiwan Solidarity Union, which is even more radical than the DPP on the independence issue.

The people’s reaction to the reemergence of the pan-Blue camp has been gratifying, to say the least. A public opinion survey, commissioned by your State Department in July, found that if the elections were to be held then, people would choose the pan-Blue ticket of myself and Dr. Soong, by close to a two-to-one margin, i.e. 42% to 23%, over the pan-Green candidates, with the remaining 34% as yet undecided.

I am not citing these figures to gloat over our chances of winning in 2004. Any politician worth his salt knows that one should never go out on a limb like that, unless he wishes to wind up with a pie in his face. Both Dr. Soong and I realize that this will be a hard fought campaign, the outcome of which hangs on so many factors that nobody could even foresee today, least of all the candidates themselves. We can only do our best to fight a clean, above-board campaign, and that is precisely what we plan to do.

In the forthcoming campaign, we aim to be perfectly honest with the electorate on every important issue of the day, so that they can make up their own minds on which team is best for the future of Taiwan. Since the cross-Strait relations seems to top your concerns about Taiwan, let me spell out our position on the cross-Strait relations for you.

I am perfectly aware that, those of you who have had any contact with officials from Taiwan or DPP lawmakers in the last few years have had an earful, or several earfuls, of the “cardinal sins” of KMT and PFP. When repeated enough, lies have a curious way of hypnotizing otherwise normal persons. Among them, and foremost goes as this: Because the Pan-blue is pro-China, the pan-Blue victory in the 2004 elections would be detrimental to the national interest of the United States!

Nothing can be farther from the truth. Our position regarding cross-Strait relations is as follows. First, we will not fall prey to Beijing’s enticements, nor yield to its threats of armed invasion. We will insist on our independent status as a separate political entity. We firmly reject the “on China, two systems” offer, because it gives us nothing that we do not enjoy already. What do the people of Taiwan enjoy at present? We enjoy individual freedoms, human rights, a free and vigorous press, a democratic system of government and a free market economy. We have no intention to trade in any of these for a pie in the sky.

Second, we take little or no interest in the so-called unification/independence issue. Most certainly, we reject the pro-China label. It’s our belief that the people in Taiwan also take little or no interest in the unification/independence issue. This issue is more appropriately left for the future generations to decide. We should concentrate on maintaining the status quo and devote more energies to economic problems. Two sides on the Taiwan Strait could and should pursue a course of “parallel development” for quite a few years ahead.

Third, we want to resume the cross-Strait dialogue that has been interrupted for too long. And there are plenty of more urgent topics that demand our attention, such as promoting and protecting the interest of almost a million Taiwanese businessmen who work and live on the mainland, or joint efforts to combat crime, or detection and prevention of another SARS epidemic.

Fourth, we believe that it would be to everybody’s benefit if direct air and shipping links are allowed, instead of pretending to go through “third posts”, that is to say, taking the roundabout way through Hong Kong or Macao, which belong to China anyway. An “air corridor” could be opened between the two sides, without jeopardizing our national security in the least bit. With the “three links” finally opened up, Taiwan’s exchange and stock markets will react quickly and just might give the sluggish economy the kick-start it desperately needs.

Fifth, I cannot emphasize enough that our number one concern will continue to be Taiwan’s security and the right to defend ourselves against unprovoked aggression. We are absolutely against the threat of some 450 missiles pointed towards Taiwan from the mainland. We must have the means to defend our island against any blitzkrieg or asymmetrical warfare that the hawks in Beijing may have up their sleeves.

To sum up, our stance vis-à-vis the People’s Republic will be firm but rational, unyielding yet accommodating. We have no intention to create difficulties for you or anybody else in this triangular relationship, particularly when all the civilized countries should be joining hands to combat terrorism. We will not play the role of a spoiler or a troublemaker in East Asia. And we will, of course, never shrink from our commitment to democracy and peace.

Last but not least, let me take this opportunity to express once again our deep gratitude to the American people for the long-term support extended to the Republic of China.
 
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